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Christopher A. McNally 
The Challenge of Refurbished State Capitalism: 
Implications for the Global Political Economic 
Order 
Abstract 
Will the global financial crisis of 2008 represent a symbolic juncture in the geo-economics of globalization? 
There are differing views, with some arguing that the Washington Consensus is dead, while others holding that 
the fundaments of the neo-liberal global order remain intact. This article engages with this debate by putting 
three distinct questions analytically prior: First, is there a political economic model that actually stands in con-
tradistinction to the Washington Consensus and the neo-liberal global order? Second, if there is a potential 
challenge to the neo-liberal order, what exactly is it? And third, if such a challenge exists, what precisely is its 
nature and logic as it interacts with the neo-liberal global order? This article argues that there is, indeed, a chal-
lenger: refurbished forms of state capitalism. However, the nature and logic of the state capitalist challenge to 
the U.S.-centered neo-liberal system is fundamentally different from the Soviet challenge during the Cold War. 
Diverse formations of capitalism are co-dependent on the global level in the present era. Refurbished state 
capitalism is no exception. It represents an “in-system” challenge, since it does not attempt to actively under-
mine and supplant the neo-liberal order, but rather to gain influence over it. New forms of refurbished state 
capitalisms are thus simultaneously in symbiosis and in rivalry with the neo-liberal global order. 
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1. Introduction 
Will the global financial crisis of 2008 represent a symbolic juncture in the geo-
economics of globalization? Many pundits argue that the Washington Consensus is rapid-
ly fading. The Washington Consensus is largely based on the principles of free-market 
capitalism, also termed the neo-liberal model of capitalism. The Consensus remained 
dominant ideationally and practically in setting the agenda for global economic govern-
ance and development.1 However, as Joseph Stiglitz put it in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, “The rules of the game have changed … The Washington Consensus poli-
cies and the underlying ideology of market fundamentalism are dead” (Stiglitz 2010, p. 
296).  
Certainly, the shift in economic power away from the advanced economies of Europe, 
the United States, and Japan that was ongoing before 2008 seems to have accelerated after 
the crisis. Most dramatically, since 2006 both China and India have emerged as the top two 
contributors to global growth (Virmani 2011, p. 12). Emerging market economies have be-
come key drivers of global growth for the first time since the end of World War Two. 
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Others are less convinced that the neo-liberal Washington Consensus and its global 
influence will rapidly give way to a new order (Crouch 2011; Nair 2011). Colin Crouch 
argues that declaring the death of neo-liberalism because of the dislocations caused by the 
financial crisis of 2008 analytically misunderstands the issue at hand. Neo-liberalism is 
based on the power and persistence of large multinational corporations domiciled in ad-
vanced economies. These favored institutions continue to deeply influence their govern-
ments and the global political economic order. It is not about the dominance of market 
forces, but about the dominance of large corporations that favor deregulation, low taxes, 
privatization, and liberalization in developing economies (Crouch 2011). Large multina-
tional corporations undergird the Washington Consensus, and, as a result, the consensus 
remains intact (Nair 2011, p. 55). 
In answering the question of whether the age of neo-liberal globalization is coming to 
an end, three distinct questions must stand analytically prior. First, is there a coherent set 
of institutional arrangements and ideational precepts that actually stands in contradistinc-
tion to the Washington Consensus and the neo-liberal global order in general? Second, if 
there is a potential challenge to the neo-liberal order, what exactly is it? Is it the Beijing 
Consensus (Ramo 2004), the Rhine model of capitalism (Albert 1993), or new forms of 
state capitalism (Bremmer 2010)? And finally, if such a challenge exists, what exactly is 
its nature and logic in rivaling the neo-liberal global order? Is its challenge one of proac-
tively attempting to undermine the neo-liberal order as the communist bloc attempted to 
do during the Cold War? Or are rival models of political economic order co-dependent 
and in symbiosis in the early 21st century? 
By addressing these three questions, a better analytical grasp can be attained regard-
ing the question of how the global political economic order might evolve in coming years. 
Each of the three questions leads to a distinct argument. First, I draw on the literatures an-
alyzing comparative economic systems, especially comparative capitalisms, to argue that 
there are, indeed, rival political economic systems on the national level. The perspective 
taken here is not one of narrowly constructing ideal-types of capitalism, as in the “Varie-
ties of Capitalism” literature (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001).2 Rather, the focus is on the duality 
of a global capitalist system that can impose considerable constraints and influences on in-
dividual political economies, yet that is populated by political economies with substantially 
different historical legacies and, therefore, institutional arrangements. Global capitalism is 
conceptualized as being constituted by an internationally variegated capitalist world system 
(cf. Jessop 2011; Streeck 2010). This view incorporates the possibility of considerable di-
versity among national and regional forms of capitalism, but emphasizes that these diverse 
formations of capitalism have to be seen as co-dependent on the global level. 
Second, the most likely challenger (though not the only one) to the neo-liberal global 
order is refurbished state capitalism. I define what exactly the nature and logic of this new 
political economic phenomenon is, and draw attention to the considerable variety among 
different national variations of refurbished state capitalism. Most importantly, refurbished 
state capitalism differs quite fundamentally from earlier instances of state capitalism. Al-
though the state dominates the economy, this is not due to some ideological principle, but 
for practical political-economic objectives. This pragmatism means that refurbished state 
capitalism has incorporated a host of neo-liberal principles: considerable privately-owned 
productive forces (both domestic and foreign) are tolerated; economies are deeply en-
meshed in the international trading system; and a host of capitalist practices have been 
adopted, including in the state-owned or -guided sectors of the economy.  
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As a result, to answer the third question, the nature and logic of the state capitalist 
challenge to the U.S.-centered neo-liberal system is fundamentally different from the So-
viet challenge during the Cold War. It also is dissimilar to the fascist challenge before 
World War Two, which ultimately collapsed an already teetering global capitalist system 
(Frieden 2006). In contrast to these two 20th century challengers, 21st century refurbished 
state capitalism is deeply integrated with the global political economic order. Practitioners 
of state capitalism at present own immense amounts of global financial assets and are de-
pendent on open market access to advanced economies for their industrialization and 
technological upgrading. In this sense, refurbished state capitalism represents an “in-
system” challenge. It does not attempt to actively undermine and supplant the present or-
der, but does attempt to gain influence over the neo-liberal order as its global economic 
weight increases. Contemporary variants of state capitalism are thus simultaneously in 
symbiosis and in rivalry with the neo-liberal global order. 
To recap, the global financial crisis of 2008 crystallized a profound challenge: power-
ful structural forces are reshaping the geo-economic landscape of globalization. The age 
of a relatively united (though it never was quite complete) agreement on basic global eco-
nomic governance principles under the Washington Consensus is increasingly in doubt 
(Kahler 2011). The growing prominence of the G-20 summits, for instance, expresses 
how emerging market economies such as China, Brazil, Russia, and India are able to chal-
lenge the existing international architecture much more directly than before.  
Emerging market economies espouse different perspectives on how to govern the 
global political economy, the origins of which can be traced back to differing institutional 
arrangements and ideational precepts underlying their domestic politico-economic sys-
tems. There are thus deep differences concerning views on the nature and logic of capital-
ism that are becoming more prominent on the global level. Nonetheless, refurbished state 
capitalism is much more an in-system challenge than prior instances of state capitalism. It 
is not a 21st century reincarnation of traditional mercantilism, but rather a new variant of 
capitalism that aims to take advantage of the neo-liberal global economic system by deep-
ly integrating with it while keeping state control intact.  
I proceed by first introducing insights from literatures on comparative capitalisms, in-
cluding a brief introduction to established national varieties of capitalism. I then elaborate 
the nature and logic of refurbished state capitalism and use the case of China, the most 
significant new economic power, and its form of state capitalism as illustration. Finally, I 
attempt to address the question of how modern refurbished forms of state capitalism chal-
lenge the existing neo-liberal order. I briefly focus on perspectives that paint new refur-
bished forms of state capitalism as a threat to the present order, noting that increased fric-
tion between refurbished state capitalism and neo-liberal market capitalism is to be ex-
pected. However, I also point to how these two forms of capitalism are deeply co-
dependent in the present era. The concluding remarks provide analytical pointers as well 
as speculate on the future of the global political economic order.  
2. Capitalist Variety 
The conception that there are fundamentally different models of capitalist development 
and accumulation dates back at least to the 1960s (Gersckenkron 1962; Shonfield 1965). It 
later gave rise to approaches on comparative capitalisms (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001; Amable 
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2003; Jackson/Deeg 2006). These approaches hold that, despite convergent pressures em-
anating from the global capitalist system, fundamental differences can be found among 
national, regional, and local capitalist institutional arrangements. This has become even 
more apparent with the demise of communism and central planning. As capitalism’s ideo-
logical competitor faltered, a previously neglected problem was brought to the fore: di-
vergence among capitalist political economies themselves 
Capitalism is in this view not a monolithic, impermeable block that is ideologically 
coherent, but rather a complex socio-economic system that adjusts to the various ways of 
different nations, cultures, and times (Albert 1993). There are different types of capital-
ism, and these shape innovative performance, the nature of welfare systems and social 
equity, as well as global competitiveness (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001; Amable 2003). Most im-
portantly, it is not that one set of institutional arrangements is superior to the other, but ra-
ther that different sets of institutions create dissimilar competitive advantages that never-
theless can be equal in terms of economic performance.  
Several generic varieties have been distinguished, especially liberal market econo-
mies, as, for example, observed in the United States and Great Britain, and coordinated 
market economies, such as those present in Germany, Switzerland, the Scandinavian 
countries, and Japan (Hall/Soskice 2001). Liberal market economies or Anglo-American 
models of capitalism can be seen as representing a generic type of capitalism that shaped 
the two primary phases of globalization: the classical era ruled by Great Britain from 
1850 to 1914; and both the “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) and neo-liberal phases 
of globalization in the post-World War II period under U.S. dominance (Frieden 2006). 
Contemporary Anglo-American capitalism now espouses for the most part neo-liberal 
economic precepts based on “free markets” and “free flows of capital.” Markets, in this 
conception, should constitute the main force responsible for the allocation of all major 
economic inputs, including finance, labor, and land.  
The present shape of neo-liberal Anglo-American capitalism is in conception quite 
closely aligned with the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). Although some of the 
policy prescriptions espoused by the Washington Consensus (e.g., fiscal policy discipline) 
are widely accepted, the consensus has been most clearly identified with privatization, de-
regulation, and liberalization, especially of global financial flows. In other words, the 
Washington Consensus is based on the principles of the neo-liberal Anglo-American 
model of capitalism. As such, it shaped the process of globalization over the past thirty 
years by setting the agenda for global economic governance and development. A carica-
ture of its ideational precepts would simply say “the market is good, the state is bad” (Al-
bert 1993, p. 253). It is, in another colloquial rendering, a “leave it to the market and get 
the state’s hands out” (Cohen/DeLong 2010, p. 119) ideology of economic governance 
that has in particular benefitted large multinational corporations (Crouch 2011). 
In contrast, coordinated market economies (present in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and non-European Japan) rely much more on the 
coordination of peak interests (capital, the state, and, in Europe, labor) rather than pure mar-
ket allocation. Such coordination frameworks are absent in Anglo-American capitalism, in-
cluding in Britain, where there is no effective framework for dialogue between government 
and producer interests (Hodges/Woolcock 1993). What have also been termed Rhineland or 
Alpine models of capitalism thus tend to emphasize regulated labor markets and the contin-
uous development of labor skills and technology within firms. Nonetheless, these systems 
also incorporate a strong belief in neutral government regulation and market competition. 
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Advanced industrial economies clearly espouse different forms of capitalism, each 
carrying a different set of institutional arrangements and ideational precepts. The compar-
ative capitalism literature stresses this point, thereby going against the grain of neo-liberal 
economic theory which posits that only one model of a purely efficient market system can 
exist. Quite the opposite, capitalist political economies have taken many different politi-
cal, institutional, and ideational shapes despite the convergent force of neo-liberal Anglo-
American capitalism in the form of the Washington Consensus on the global level.  
Evidently, differences in domestic political economic arrangements have given rise to 
differing viewpoints on global economic issues. Continental European and Japanese mod-
els of capitalism have challenged the Anglo-American global consensus on various occa-
sions. Yet, in the 20 years from 1990 to 2010 none of the coordinated models could rival 
the economic heft of the United States. Their emphasis on regulated labor markets and 
welfare systems also created the perception that they were not flexible enough to adjust to 
economic change and weighed down by expansive welfare systems and high taxes. 
As a result, their challenge to the Anglo-American brand of capitalism never became 
definitive, and the Washington Consensus informed most aspects of global governance. 
Indeed, differing precepts and institutional arrangements on the domestic level among 
capitalisms have not fundamentally challenged the global neo-liberal consensus. Rather, if 
there ever will be a true rival to the Washington Consensus, it might emanate from the re-
furbished state capitalisms of emerging market economies, especially from China, which 
seems to be producing a truly monumental alternate model of capitalism.  
3. Refurbished State Capitalism 
In recent years several analysts have noted how a novel form of capitalism – refurbished 
state capitalism – is poised to challenge the established neo-liberal Anglo-American order 
(Cohen/DeLong 2010; Choate 2009; Bremmer 2010). In fact, since the end of the Cold 
War, the world’s economic powers, including practitioners of coordinated models of capi-
talism, have generally agreed on the wisdom of letting market competition and private en-
terprise shape economic outcomes (Kahler 2011). But now the rapid rise of powerful state 
capitalist systems in China, Russia, India, and Brazil could undermine the established 
global economic consensus. In this section, I attempt to provide a clear conceptualization of 
refurbished state capitalisms, highlighting their internal variety, exposure to the forces of 
neo-liberal globalization, and their often hybrid institutional nature. I then focus on institu-
tional features that all forms of contemporary state capitalism share in common, leading 
over to an analysis of the by far largest practitioner of refurbished state capitalism: China. 
State capitalist systems have been conceived of in many different ways.3 Traditional-
ly, state capitalism has often been identified with Stalinist economic planning. The state 
here owns most productive assets, controls the economy, and essentially acts like one sin-
gle giant corporation. It uses central planning tools to manage the economy and create big 
spurts of industrialization, as in the Soviet Union during the 1930s (Kornais 1992). Yet, 
state capitalism has in reality been associated with a range of political economic frame-
works, ranging from communism, Stalinism, and socialism to neo-corporatism, mercan-
tilism, and fascism. More precisely, state capitalism denotes a political economy in which 
the state directs and controls key productive forces, yet follows capitalist principles. This 
can even occur in a nominally socialist system such as China’s.  
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Contemporary state capitalism is often conceived of as standing in direct contradis-
tinction to liberal free market principles, such as those associated with the Washington 
Consensus (Bremmer 2010). However, 21st century refurbished state capitalism has little 
to do with Stalinism and socialist central planning. It encompasses a rather diverse range 
of capitalist systems in which the state continues to perform key economic functions. 
First and foremost, therefore, refurbished state capitalism is itself a variegated force. 
There are considerable differences in the role of the state, the reach of state-owned enter-
prises and parastatals, and degrees of openness to foreign investment and capital flows. 
“It is a form of bureaucratically engineered capitalism particular to each government that 
practices it” (Bremmer 2010, p. 23). Resource exporters such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, 
for instance, tend to have a more state-dominated economy. Moreover, there can be con-
siderable differences within national economies in terms of the role of the state and de-
grees of international integration. The large emerging market economies - Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China - are all continental or at least sub-continental sized. They contain dis-
tinct sub-national economic units, some primarily dependent on one resource or industry, 
while others are deeply integrated into international trade and production flows.  
Second, refurbished state capitalism has emerged in an era of intense neo-liberal 
globalization. No economy that desired rapid industrialization could afford to shut itself 
out from globalization’s accelerating trade, knowledge, and capital flows. Incentivized to 
open their economies, practitioners of refurbished state capitalism in turn absorbed many 
neo-liberal precepts, from liberalizing labor markets to opening up capital markets. In the 
case of China this generated a market-liberal form of state capitalism (cf. ten Brink 2010; 
ten Brink 2011a; also Chu/So 2010). Perhaps most important is the fact that even in the 
management of state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds, governments have 
introduced capitalist practices, such as performance incentives for top managers, mergers 
and acquisitions, advisory services by international fund managers, international account-
ing standards, stock market listings, and other efforts at restructuring and improving cor-
porate governance. Although not always successful, governments have also been at pains 
to shield such institutions from overt political interference. 
State capitalism is therefore not a 21st century creature of traditional mercantilism. All 
the leading practitioners of state capitalism in the world today, including China, Brazil, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India, are deeply enmeshed in the international trading system 
and practice different degrees of open trading and investment relations. They host multi-
national corporations and attempt to take advantage of global production and knowledge 
networks.  
Finally, modern state capitalist systems are in many ways hybrids. They have mixed 
economies with often substantial domestic private sectors. For example, Reliance Indus-
tries, a family-held conglomerate in India, is the largest corporation in India by market 
capitalization and the second largest company by revenue after the Indian Oil Corporation 
(CNBC-TV18 2012). It is an important player in the petrochemicals, infrastructure, tele-
communications, life sciences, and retail sectors. Contemporary state capitalism therefore 
does not imply a purely state-owned economy and can incorporate large privately-owned 
productive forces. 
So, what are the defining characteristics of refurbished state capitalism in the early 
21st century? Since there is no single definitive model at present, I will focus on aspects 
that all practitioners of state capitalism share in common. The primary distinction with 
neo-liberal market capitalism is that in refurbished state capitalist systems there is a con-
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siderable distrust of markets and full-out economic liberalization. This does not mean that 
markets are unimportant. To the contrary, practitioners of refurbished state capitalism are 
fully aware that experiments with socialist central planning failed. Markets are needed to 
set prices, direct supplies of scarce resources, and create competitive pressures. However, 
this is a pragmatic use of markets. Ultimately, state capitalist systems share a strong belief 
in the potential benefits of state power, a belief that undergirds their economic manage-
ment philosophies. Market forces are good, as long as state control over key economic as-
pects remains intact. Economic development has to be carefully managed by statist 
measures, rather than left to unpredictable and fickle market forces. 
This economic management philosophy has created a set of institutional arrangements 
that in variations can be found in all refurbished forms of state capitalism. First, all state 
capitalist systems use industrial policy tools to foster national innovation systems. Indus-
trial policy tools and the structure of government bureaucracies in charge of them can 
vary widely. Pilot agencies to centrally steer industrial development have been set up in 
China, as well as in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea during their earlier spurts of indus-
trialization. In other cases, the bureaucratic structure is more diffuse. However, all state 
capitalist systems tend to actively employ industrial policy tools, including the strategic 
use of foreign investment, measures to foster technology transfers, various trade tools, 
government-guided mergers and acquisitions, competition policy, preferential access to 
credit, and the setting up of designated zones with preferential policies to develop new in-
dustrial sectors and technologies.  
Industrial policy tools are, moreover, applied to foster national champions. These can 
be either state-owned (in full or, more commonly, as a majority share in a listed corpora-
tion) or privately-owned entities. Privately-owned national champions are especially 
common in sectors with fast moving technological and/or market changes, such as tele-
coms equipment makers in China (Huawei and ZTE) or IT services in India (Tata; In-
fosys; HCL, etc.). State-owned national champions are clearly most prominent in the very 
large resource corporations that emerging market economies have created over the past 30 
years. A list of the top global corporations in the oil and gas sector is now dominated by 
national oil corporations such as Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Petrobras (Brazil), Petronas 
(Malaysia), China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec, and CNOOC (China), Indi-
anOil and ONGC (India), and Rosneft and Gazprom (Russia) (PetroStrategies 2012). 
Similarly, large national champions have emerged in mining and processing, including 
entities such as Vale S.A. in iron ore (Brazil; mostly privatized) and Chinalco in aluminum 
(China; state-backed holding company with one major listed subsidiary). In essence, nation-
al champions are most common in industries that compete over scarce resources and that 
have the potential to successfully capture shares of the next leading sector (Mod-
elski/Thompson 1996). There are, however, substantial variations in the types and amounts 
of state support available, as well as in terms of ownership structures and corporate forms. 
Thirdly, besides the use of industrial policy tools and the fostering of national cham-
pions, sovereign wealth funds have become the third major plank of contemporary state 
capitalism. Sovereign wealth funds are state-owned and -managed investment funds that 
invest in a variety of domestic and global financial assets, including foreign currency, 
stocks, bonds, real estate, precious metals, and other financial instruments. Some take 
strategic stakes in corporations; others are only interested in small minority shares for 
capital appreciation. Most sovereign wealth funds are either funded by foreign exchange 
assets or excess income from national resource exports (especially oil). Some of these 
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funds, such as Norway’s Government Pension Fund, are highly transparent and in politi-
cal economies that cannot be considered state capitalist. Most sovereign wealth funds, 
though, have strategic long-term goals to maximize returns with little regard for transpar-
ency, such as those in Saudi Arabia and China. In these cases, there is a fear that political 
goals could influence their investment decisions, making them strategic tools to foster na-
tional security goals (Bremmer 2010). Certainly, as the large pool of assets under their 
management continues to grow, sovereign wealth funds are likely to have a greater impact 
on all types of asset classes.  
Finally, all practitioners of state capitalism have in some way harnessed domestic fi-
nancial systems to support industrial policy goals and the building of national champions. 
This can happen directly via state-controlled banking systems, as in China, or with less di-
rected credit and a smaller presence of state-owned banks as in Brazil’s financial system. 
The state, though, tends to exert some control over the allocation of credit and investment 
that affects the private sector. 
In sum, refurbished state capitalisms view markets with more skepticism than other 
models of capitalism, including the coordinated models of Northern Europe and Japan. 
They often actively “manage” markets for specific policy ends. In these systems the state 
dominates the economy not due to some ideological principle, but for purely pragmatic 
reasons: to build national economies and capture shares of future leading sectors. As a 
consequence, all state capitalist systems actively employ industrial policy tools and in-
clude a large swath of state-ownership in industry, finance, and other key sectors.  
Evidently, modern state capitalism has adopted various liberal capitalist practices, in-
cluding monetary incentives, capital markets, and economic internationalization. But it dif-
fers in its ideas, interests, and institutions from the ideal-typical neo-liberal conception of 
capitalism. This is a hybrid system, relying on material incentives, market competitive pres-
sures, and other measures, while also using strategic trade tools, state ownership, directed 
finance, and a host of industrial policy methods. China exemplifies this new breed of state 
capitalism in the early 21st century and is often seen as the world’s leading practitioner of it.  
4. The Case of China’s State Capitalism 
The view that China’s political economy has evolved over the past 30 years into a form of 
state-led capitalism has gained increasing prominence (Huang 2008; Bremmer 2010). 
However, as with other forms of refurbished state capitalism, China’s employs market 
practices, capitalist incentives, and prudent macro-economic regulation, while performing 
quite well in aggregated economic terms. So, what is the nature and logic of China’s re-
furbished state capitalism?  
As with most modern forms of state capitalism, China’s model encompasses substan-
tial internal variety, has been deeply exposed to the forces of neo-liberal globalization, 
and represents a hybrid in terms of its institutional arrangements (McNally 2012). I there-
fore first stress that China is not an economic monolith guided by ultimate and compre-
hensive central state forces. Quite the reverse: China represents a heterogeneous political 
economy with considerable local variation. There are considerable differences in the role 
of the state, local governance arrangements, and degrees of openness to foreign invest-
ment and capital flows. Coastal areas such as Guangdong and Shanghai are deeply inte-
grated into international trade and production networks, while some interior provinces 
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such as Shanxi and Inner Mongolia resemble resource exporters like Russia and Saudi 
Arabia with large state conglomerates dominating economic activity.  
Secondly, as with all contemporary cases of refurbished state capitalism, the influence 
of globalization has allowed neo-liberal market practices to enter China (cf. ten Brink 
2010, 2011a; Chu/So 2010). Therefore, in terms of policies, China has adopted more free-
market practices than earlier developers in East Asia (Lee/Hahn/Lin 2002; Chu/So 2010). 
These include substantial access by foreign capital to China’s manufacturing and retail 
sectors; the relatively rapid development of stock markets and intensive use of interna-
tional capital markets; and a relatively flexible domestic labor market. As a result of these 
factors, China has emerged as a massive global trading power and manufacturer with a 
highly internationalized export sector. China’s adaptation of neo-liberal market strategies 
has perhaps created one of the world’s highest “absorption capacities” for global manu-
facturing capital among developing economies (Edmonds/La Croix/Li 2008). 
In other respects, however, China has followed quite closely in the footsteps of its 
East Asian forerunners, using programs of subsidized investment in key leading indus-
tries, an export-led growth strategy, and the suppression of domestic consumption to en-
courage high savings and investment rates (Edmonds/La Croix/Li 2008). Maybe most sig-
nificantly, China has been using exchange rate controls to maintain an under-valued cur-
rency that fosters export performance, just as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea did before 
it (McNally 2012).  
Finally, China represents a hybrid, combining Western, Asian, socialist, as well as 
Chinese historical and modern elements. Especially China’s historical background, both 
socialist and imperial, frames its state-centric approach to economic management (cf. 
Gates 1996; Jacques 2009). Despite some neo-liberal impulses, therefore, China’s devel-
opment policies feature a substantial role for the state and have emphasized the develop-
ment of domestic industry and technology. The Chinese party-state retains control over 
the commanding heights of the economy via large state firms and state research institutes. 
Crucial sectors ranging from telecoms to airlines, rail, oil and gas, and all mineral mining 
and processing tend to be majority state-owned or state-controlled.  
In essence, China’s emergent capitalism encompasses a unique dialectic of state-led 
capitalism juxtaposed with entrepreneurial network capitalism (McNally 2008; 2012). 
Top-down, state-guided development dominates, but bottom-up a myriad of medium and 
small sized private firms have used entrepreneurial strategies to create highly flexible 
production and knowledge networks with global reach. This bottom-up network character 
of China’s capitalism relies in part on informal personal relations (guanxi) that enable 
private Chinese businesses to link up with state officials as well as each other to build 
trust and compensate for a lack of institutional certainty (McNally 2011).4  
This networked element is most apparent in China’s small- to medium-size private 
enterprise sector, where myriads of companies can collaborate to create economies of 
scale, and access technology, markets, and finance (Williamson/Zheng 2008). These vi-
brant and globally enmeshed networks of producers and traders have in fact allowed Chi-
na to become a key component of the Western-led economic system, assimilating multi-
national production and knowledge networks into China (Steinfeld 2010). 
And as with other refurbished state capitalisms, China’s contains elements of indus-
trial policy, national champions, and sovereign wealth funds. The harnessing of its do-
mestic financial systems to support industrial policy goals is also prominent. China’s re-
furbished state capitalism thus incorporates top-down a large and powerful state enter-
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prise sector; bottom-up entrepreneurial networks with considerable flexibility and global 
reach; and outside-in influences from the forces of neo-liberal globalization, including 
high levels of foreign trade, direct investment, and knowledge transfers (McNally 2012). 
It ultimately constitutes a refurbished form of indicative planning that combines localized 
policy experimentation with vibrant market competition (Heilmann 2010). 
Because of its economic heft, China is often viewed as the leading edge of new forms 
of state capitalism in emerging market economies. To be sure, China’s model of capital-
ism still remains subordinated to neo-liberal Anglo-American capitalism in globally sys-
temic terms. Yet, the nature and logic of China’s emergent state capitalism is beginning to 
have an increasing impact. In essence, China’s state capitalism puts less trust in free mar-
kets and more trust in state guidance. Market forces are utilized, as long as state control 
over key economic aspects remains intact. And as can be found in all variations of refur-
bished state capitalisms, the prevailing economic management philosophy is that econom-
ic development has to be carefully managed by statist measures to foster the conditions 
for national economic development and industrial catch-up. China’s state capitalism, as 
that of Brazil, India, and others, distinguishes itself not only in terms of institutional ar-
rangements, but also in terms of ideational precepts on how economic affairs should be 
managed (McNally 2012; ten Brink 2011b). 
5. The Challenge of Refurbished State Capitalisms 
In his classical analysis of capitalist variation right after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Michel 
Albert argues that after the no-holds-barred confrontation between capitalism and com-
munism during the Cold War, capitalism emerged victorious and seemingly unrivaled in 
the 1990s. But within the capitalist camp, two dominant models of capitalism were evi-
dent: the neo-American model and the Rhine model centered on Germany. These differ-
ing models gave capitalism “two faces, two personalities” (Albert 1993, p. 18) with each 
variety having “an inner logic which contradicts the other” (Albert 1993, p. 19). Accord-
ing to Albert, these divergent currents of capitalism are unlikely to ever converge or meld, 
but rather are poised to challenge each other for global influence.  
Following in the footsteps of Michel Albert, several recent analyses have envisioned a 
pitched struggle for leadership among different forms of capitalism. However, the rival to 
the neo-liberal global capitalist order led by the United States is not the European coordi-
nated model, but refurbished state capitalism, especially the brand practiced by China. 
Joshua Cooper Ramo coined the term Beijing Consensus and argued that China’s interna-
tional reemergence is “already reshaping the international order by introducing a new 
physics of development and power” (Ramo 2004, p. 2). In his view, the Beijing Consen-
sus eschews aspects of the neo-liberal mantra, such as privatization and free trade, while 
pursuing a development approach that is flexible and “does not believe in uniform solu-
tions for every situation” (Ramo 2004, p. 4). Accordingly, the Beijing Consensus denotes 
unconventional approaches to economic policy-making, including “a combination of 
mixed ownership, basic property rights, and heavy government intervention” (Yao 2010). 
It also relies on a disinterested government that is authoritarian in nature and “not perma-
nently beholden to certain groups or regions” (Yao 2010).  
While Ramo thinks that the Beijing Consensus is “flexible enough that it is barely 
classifiable as a doctrine” (Ramo 2004, p. 4), the term has come to denote that China is at-
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tempting to supplant the Western-led neo-liberal global order with its brand of state capi-
talism, including an entirely different conception of how the international community 
should function (Halper 2010). Going beyond the Beijing Consensus per se, the possibil-
ity of a struggle between the established Washington Consensus and refurbished state 
capitalisms has become quite prominent. Pat Choate, for instance, holds that while the 
great economic conflict of the 20th century pitted capitalism against Marxism, the battle of 
the twenty-first century will be characterized by state versus market capitalism (Choate 
2009). In his view, market capitalism is “losing badly” to state-sponsored enterprises in 
the developing world. “What we have seen in industry after industry where the U.S. 
comes up against these corporations … a privately-owned firm cannot compete with what 
is a state-owned firm” (Task 2011). 
Ian Bremmer likewise argues that the Anglo-American model of organizing the inter-
national political economy will come under increasing duress due to a proliferation of 
state capitalist practices in the developing world and beyond. In contrast to neo-liberal 
models, state capitalist systems do not employ markets primarily for efficiency gains, but 
for political purposes, especially to enhance national power and state elites’ chances of 
survival (Bremmer 2010, p. 5). Further following this line of reasoning, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce and the Coalition of Services Industries in a 2011 joint-report noted that the 
ascendance of state-owned and state-sponsored enterprises in the world economy “threat-
ens the competitiveness of American companies and workers in world markets and un-
dermines our country’s core belief in (sic) market-based economy” (Palmer 2011).  
According to these perspectives, the global neo-liberal order is facing a possibly fatal 
challenge; and the challengers are refurbished state capitalisms in emerging market econ-
omies, like China, India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and others. 
These perspectives express a worldview that takes the struggle of competing systems or 
empires as central, drawing historically on liberal capitalism’s battles with communism 
and fascism during the 20th century. Given the nature and logic of refurbished forms of 
state capitalism, however, it is doubtful whether perspectives based on a clear-cut struggle 
among two highly differentiated political economic systems for global dominance cap-
tures the state capitalist challenge properly. 
Certainly, emerging market economies espouse new global perspectives based on the 
institutional arrangements and ideational precepts underlying their domestic politico-
economic systems. They, for the most part, advocate different views regarding markets, 
the role of the state, and the ultimate goals of economic governance. No doubt, refur-
bished state capitalisms are likely to generate a challenge to the neo-liberal global capital-
ist order (McNally 2012).  
Perhaps the most prominent example of this regards differing views on openness to 
capital flows and currency management. For instance, Chinese policy-makers do not 
share the view advocated by the United States and other advanced industrial economies 
that exchange rates are prices to be determined by the market. Quite the reverse, the ex-
changes rate is perceived as subordinate to China’s broader development strategies 
(Kroeber 2011). This is not unlike earlier instances of industrial catch-up, during which 
economies such as Germany, France, South Korea, and Japan utilized undervalued ex-
change rates to their advantage. 
In a similar fashion, all forms of refurbished state capitalism espouse industrial policy 
to foster new leading sectors, ranging from pebble bed reactors to aviation. Armed with 
ever larger war chests of foreign cash, these economies can afford such policies, even if 
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they sometimes end in failure. As Cohen and DeLong argue, the “real danger has to do 
with where the spillovers of innovation go” (Cohen/DeLong 2010, p. 124). If emerging 
market economies can use industrial policy tools to foster innovation and harness its spill-
over effects, the United States with its lack of well-established bureaucratic capabilities to 
undertake effective industrial policy would likely fall behind. Induced growth that result-
ed from the great inventions of the 19th and 20th Centuries and propelled U.S. economic 
development (e.g., from railways to the Internet) might then be a thing of the past (Co-
hen/DeLong 2010). 
Nevertheless, the rapid rise of powerful state capitalist systems in China, Russia, In-
dia, and Brazil is unlikely to rapidly overturn the established neo-liberal global economic 
order. The capitalist world system is internationally variegated (cf. Jessop 2011; Streeck 
2010), and thus incorporates considerable diversity among national and regional forms of 
capitalism. But this variation occurs in “a context of economic and political interdepend-
ence” (Streeck 2010, p. 39) on the global level. The neo-liberal global economic order 
will therefore continue its influence, including deepening global market integration and 
financial flows. Moreover, it is likely that the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank, will have considerable staying-power 
while gradually undergoing changes in the composition of their major stakeholders.  
The international reemergence of large political economies such as China and India 
has highlighted the international variegation of capitalism and crystallized the nature and 
logic of refurbished state capitalisms. Yet, emerging market economies have not created 
models of capitalism divorced from global currents. Rather, they have taken advantage of 
the neo-liberal project of globalization. As a result, the individual national economies of 
emerging market economies have since 1980 all become embedded in the global political 
economy to varying extents, benefitting from regional and global economic integration. 
For example, overseas Chinese capital lead the way in the 1990s to create a new interna-
tional division of labor and value creation that transformed China into the globe’s fore-
most production platform (Steinfeld 2008; Hsing 1998; Zweig/Chen 2007).  
On closer inspection, therefore, China’s state capitalism encompasses features that 
have created a deep symbiosis with the American, Japanese, and European economies 
(McNally 2012; ten Brink 2011b). China’s extremely vibrant and globally enmeshed pri-
vate entrepreneurial sector has allowed its economy to become a key component of the 
neo-liberal global economic system, assimilated multi-firm, multinational global produc-
tion and knowledge networks. According to Edward Steinfeld this could indicate that 
China’s form of state capitalism may not be a fundamental threat to the neo-liberal Anglo-
American order (Steinfeld 2010). 
Undoubtedly, the way refurbished state capitalisms challenge the U.S.-centered neo-
liberal order is fundamentally different from the Soviet challenge during the Cold War. 
Refurbished state capitalisms are deeply enmeshed in the global political economy and 
their practitioners own immense amounts of global financial assets, most significantly 
U.S. treasury debt. Both models of capitalism are thus simultaneously co-dependent and 
in competition. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Powerful structural forces are generating a shift in the global geo-economic landscape. 
Financial and economic power is gradually moving away from the United States, Japan, 
and Western Europe. Emerging market economies are beginning to generate the bulk of 
global economic growth, becoming new dynamic centers of economic activity (Virmani 
2011). The prominent role of the state in most of the emerging market economies, howev-
er, places them largely outside the varieties of capitalism that the rules-based international 
order has accommodated so far in the post-World War II era (Kahler 2011). Refurbished 
forms of state capitalism hold profoundly different views on the roles of the state, mar-
kets, and society. Consequently, their emergence could lay bare highly different perspec-
tives on economic governance, challenging the existing global political economic order, 
especially the Washington Consensus.  
This is reflected in how emerging market economies such as China, Brazil, Russia, 
and India are testing the existing global institutional architecture much more directly than 
before the 2008 financial crisis. Major economic powers, both new and old, must 
acknowledge that, while they are growing ever more closely intertwined economically 
they champion different forms of capitalism. The Western system, especially in its neo-
liberal Anglo-American form, is built on specific principles for how capitalism should 
function. Refurbished forms of state capitalism do not fully share these principles. For 
sure, all forms of capitalism have benefitted from the openness and expansiveness of the 
Western-led postwar order (Ikenberry 2008). But with the liberalization of international 
finance in the 1980s, the system has developed yet again (as before 1914) deep contradic-
tions that undermine its stability (Frieden 2006).  
In particular, the financial crisis of 2008 has provided the leaders of refurbished state 
capitalisms with new evidence that enlightened state management can offer protection 
against the natural excesses of free markets. And it also convinced these emerging market 
economies that adopting all the precepts of the Washington Consensus can be dangerous. 
Following Colin Crouch’s understanding of neo-liberalism, this is a system that relies on 
and maximizes the power of large corporations, especially multinational corporations domi-
ciled in advanced industrial economies (Crouch 2011). If emerging market economies want 
to compete globally, they face several handicaps: technological levels are lower; often en-
terprise institutions are weak; financial systems are not as efficient in channeling capital; 
and, most importantly, indigenous corporations lack the organizational and market reach on 
a global scale that their multinational competitors possess. This last facet has been accentu-
ated by the present phase of neo-liberal globalization that opened much of the world to mul-
tinational manufacturing capital. Multinational corporations therefore can take advantage of 
lower labor, land, regulatory, and resource costs in emerging market economies, while re-
taining their organizational advantages and access to advanced industrial markets. 
Refurbished state capitalisms, one therefore might interpret, are the logical institu-
tional answer for weaker players in the global system to withstand the sheer power of 
multinational corporations and the increasingly destabilizing force of international finance 
(McNally 2012). By protecting domestic financial markets and actively building national 
champions, they can successfully compete over scarce resources in the global race to cap-
ture shares of the next leading sector (Modelski/Thompson 1996).  
This analytical interpretation is certainly not unproblematic. The growth of refur-
bished state capitalisms might ultimately create large protectionist pressures in advanced 
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economies and hence undermine the neo-liberal economic order. Conversely, as long as 
large multinational corporations benefit from globalization, protectionist pressures might 
be kept at bay in advanced economies. And as long as refurbished state capitalisms can 
gain sufficient advantages to capture some shares of future leading sectors, they could 
continue to support major aspects of the neo-liberal order. Perhaps an alliance between 
the corporate forces of neo-liberalism and refurbished state capitalisms could underpin 
global capitalism in coming decades. 
Certainly, so far, refurbished state capitalisms have produced a dynamic mix of mutu-
al dependence, symbiosis, competition, and friction with the still dominant neo-liberal 
model of capitalism. The neo-liberal order does therefore not necessarily have to become 
unhinged due to the state capitalist challenge. Large doses of cooperation and shared au-
thority over the global capitalist system exist among the major economic powers at pre-
sent. Rather than an all-out struggle, the more likely outcome is a gradual shift in the 
global consensus (McNally 2012). Already, the international policy accord has started to 
move away from the pure neo-liberal stance of the Washington Consensus to embrace 
more state-managed solutions (Kahler 2010). All major economic players, for example, 
are rethinking financial liberalization and starting to reemphasize aspects of financial reg-
ulation and controls over capital flows.  
This is a new and messier reality. A more state-centric and state-controlled approach 
to global economic governance is undoubtedly gaining in prominence. If the successes of 
refurbished state capitalism in China, India, Brazil, Russia, and beyond are sustained, 
their models of capitalism are likely to alter the global political economic order. But these 
are pragmatic systems of state capitalism. They have as much to loose from the collapse 
of the neo-liberal political economic order as their competitors in advanced economies. 
Notes 
 
1 The original formulation of the Washington Consensus was presented by John Williamson and prescribed 
ten broad sets of economic policy recommendations. See Williamson (1990). 
2 For critiques of the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach see Pontusson (2005), Streeck (2010) and Becker (2009). 
3 An alternate term would be “state coordinated economy.” However, the term state capitalism is used so 
prominently with regard to emerging market economies that there is analytical validity in trying to pre-
cisely define it as a contemporary phenomenon and apply it to the political economic systems of large 
emerging market economies. 
4 This aspect of China’s emergent capitalism is sometimes referred to as Chinese “network capitalism” or 
“guanxi capitalism.” 
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